محمود خاتمی

[توضیحِ اضافه شده در ۲۰ آبان ۹۳: در جدولی که در ادامه می‌آید برخی بخش‌های برخی نوشته‌های ادعاییِ محمود خاتمی و برخی بخش‌های نوشته‌های (ادعایی) دیگران نقل شده است. مطالبِ نقل شده بر گرفته از مقالاتی است که در پنج روزِ منتهی به یک‌شنبه ۱۸ آبانِ ۹۳، دربارهٔ بعضی نوشته‌های ادعاییِ محمود خاتمی، استادِ فلسفه دانشگاه تهران، منتشر شد. نویسندگانِ این مطالب مدعی هستند (و مستنداً برای ادعاهای خود استدلال می‌کنند) که (حسب‌موردْ تمام یا بخشی از) رسالهٔ دکتری، مقاله، یا کتاب‌هایی که خاتمی ادعا کرده محصول پژوهش خودش هستند در اصل نوشته و محصول کارِ کسانِ دیگری هستند. همهٔ ارجاعاتِ مربوط و برخی ادعاهای مطرح شده در جدول آمده است.]

[توضیحِ اضافه شده در ۱۳ آذر ۹۳: دانشگاه تهران (در ۱۰ آذر ۹۳) بیانیه‌ای منتشر کرده است که در مقدمهٔ آن توضیح داده شده که بیانیهٔ مذکور با «نظر به نشر شایعاتی مبنی بر عدم رعایت امانت داری علمی یکی از اعضاء هیأت علمی دانشگاه تهران در فضاهای مجازی» منتشر می‌شود. محمود خاتمی «یکی از» اعضاء هیأت علمیِ آن دانشگاه است، و می‌توان حدس زد شاید او مورد نظر بوده است و نیز می‌توان حدس زد که شاید منظور از «شایعات» از جمله مراجعی باشد که جدولِ زیر بر مبنایِ آنها تهیه شده است.]

1	Khatami’s dissertation, “The Unitary Consciousness: Toward a Solution for the Ontological Crisis in Modern Theories of the Self”
	THIS THESIS IS MY WORK AND HAS NOT BEEN OFFERED IN CANDIDATURE FOR ANY OTHER DEGREE OR DIPLOMA Mahmoud Khatami February,1996
1.1		Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophical Study of Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Bin Yaqsan (by Sami Hawi)
1.1.1	(p.29) “Sadra, for example, depicts our ‘blank’ and receptive mind as constituting and perfecting itself, and struggling to obtain far-reaching conclusions entirely on its own. Our progressive ascension, Sadra holds, has a tint of inevitableness and necessity. Seemingly without any preconceived notions we achieve cognisance of causality, God, eternity of the world, and mysticism.  It appears as though any mind will reach the same truths if it took as its point of departure the unsophisticated given of experience and followed the canons of consistency. Thus, Alfred North Whitehead’s well-known dictum that….”	(p.94) “He [Ibn Tufayl] depicts Hayy’s ‘blank’ and receptive mind as constituting and perfecting itself, and struggling to obtain far-reaching conclusions entirely on its own. Hayy’s progressive ascension has a tint of inevitableness and necessity. Seemingly without any preconceived notions he achieve cognizance of causality, God, eternity of the world, and mysticism. It appears as though any mind will reach the same truths that Hayy reached if it took as its point of departure the unsophisticated given of experience and followed the canons of consistency. Thus, Alfred North Whitehead’s well-known dictum that….”
1.1.2	(p.33) “The Illuminative school believes, as instanced by Sadra, that while theories may interpret facts, at the same time they abstract from the realities of the surrounding world as we encounter them in the locus of immediate experience. Pure theories, without concrete embodiment and without seeing them in their actual operation, estrange the mind from its natural dwelling place, the world of experience.”	(p.101) “Ibn Tufayl believed, as instanced by Parts II and III of the treatise, that while theories may interpret facts, at the same time they abstract from the realities of the surrounding world as we encounter them in the locus of immediate experience. Pure theories, without concrete embodiment and without seeing them in their actual operation, estrange the mind from its natural dwelling place, the world of experience.”
	“just an instance”
1.2		The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy
1.2.1	…	…
1.3		The Inner Dimension
1.3.1	…	…
1.4		Naturalism and Subjectivism
1.4.1	…	…
1.5		Armstrong’s “Mind–Body Problem: Philosophical Theories”
1.5.1	…	…
[DN]	The dissertation is an amazing case of plagiarism. Pages after pages are directly copied  from the following works:  [2] The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy,  [3] The Inner Dimension,  [4] Naturalism and Subjectivism,  [5] Armstrong’s “Mind–Body Problem: Philosophical Theories” and  [1] Islamic Naturalism and Mysticism: A Philosophical Study of Ibn Tufayl’s Hayy Bin Yaqsan (by Sami Hawi).
[S]	ورای اتهام تقلب: (صفحه‌ی تشکر پایان‌نامه:) This research was kindly funded by the Iranian Ministry of High Education for which I unreservedly acknowledge my gratitude.
2 [K]	"The epistemological quest: from the possibility of experience to the possibility of communication", Organon F, 10 (2003): 357-379. (مقاله)
2.1		Andrew N. Carpenter, "Davidson's transcendental argumentation", in Jeff Malpas, ed., From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental, Routledge, 2003, pp. 219-237.
2.1.1	Philosophers commonly associate questions of the form "what are the conditions for the possibility of X" with Kant and with Kant's novel philosophical methodology, transcendental argumentation. Kant's genius, however, did not lie in his merely raising questions of this form; many philosophers had asked questions like this before Kant.	Philosophers commonly associate questions of the form "what are the conditions for the possibility of X" with Kant and with Kant's novel philosophical methodology, transcendental argumentation. Kant's genius, however, did not lie in his merely raising questions of this form; many philosophers had asked questions like this before Kant.
	البته مقاله‌ی آقای کارپنتر چکیده ندارد و مقاله‌ی آقای خاتمی دارد و عنوانِ بعضی بخش‌ها متفاوت است؛ اما، غیر از اینها، من ابتدای همه‌ی پاراگراف‌های این دو نسخه را مقایسه کردم و اختلافی ندیدم.
3 [H]	…
4 [M]	محمود خاتمی ، تفسیری از امر پیشینی کانت، فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه، 1384/01/01، 1، 1. (مقاله)
4.1		Dufrenne, Mikel. The notion of the A Priori. Northwestern University Press, 2009. «اول‌بار در سالِ 1966 چاپ شده است»
4.1.1	(صفحه‌یِ 83، دومینِ صفحه‌یِ مقاله) In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the a priori, Kant prefers a reflective analysis which makes the a priori appear. The reflective analysis, basing itself on synthetic judgments, shows that "the highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."(194) These conditions make the a priori appear. The medium of synthetic judgments is the "whole in which all our representations are contained," that is, inner sense, whose a priori form is time. And the unity required in judgment rests on the unity of apperception. This unity, which tends to emphasize the "I" of the "I think," is, at least in the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason, the keystone of the Kantian system. But we find even in its first edition that all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to transcendental consciousness "namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception."(142) For "we are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge."(141) It is therefore an absolutely primary principle that the various empirical consciousnesses must be linked to one unique consciousness of self. This consciousness is the simple representation: “I.” Kant adds: ''Whether this repre­sentation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty."(142)	(صفحه‌هایِ 12 و 13 کتاب) In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the a priori manifested by synthetic judgments, Kant performs both a reflective analysis which makes the transcendental subject appear and an analysis-termed phenomenological by Ricoeur88­-which tends to psychologize the transcendental. The reflective analysis, basing itself on synthetic judgments, shows that "the highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."34 These conditions make transcendental subjectivity appear. The medium of all synthetic judgments is the "whole in which all our representations are contained" –i.e., inner sense, whose a priori form is time. And the unity required in judgment "rests on the unity of apperception." This unity, which tends to emphasize the "I" of the "I think," is, at least in the second edition of the Critique, the keystone of the Kantian system. But we find it even in the first edition: all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to transcendental consciousness-"namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception."85 For "we are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge." 36 It is therefore an absolutely primary principle that the various empirical consciousnesses must be linked to one unique consciousness of self. This consciousness is the simple representation: I. Kant adds: ''Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness ) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily con­ ditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty."37
4.1.2	(پارگرافِ بعدی مقاله‌) Nevertheless, this “faculty” does further enlighten us concerning the nature of a priori characteristic of subjectivity. Above all, it permits us to discern in the "I think," "this spontaneity" by means of which I can "call myself an intelligence" (169), the act of understanding: ''The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding”.(143)	(پاراگرافِ بعدیِ کتاب) Yet this faculty does further enlighten us concerning the nature of subjectivity. Above all, it permits us to discern in the "I think" -"this spontaneity" by means of which I can "call myself an intelligence"38-the act of understanding: ''The unity of ap­ perception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding. ''39
4.1.3	(پاراگراف بعدی مقاله) However, if the a priori is a condition of knowledge, it is essential to apply the condition and in this context subsumption is inevitably constitution in the non-ontological sense to which Kant limits himself.	(صفحه‌یِ 14 کتاب) If the a priori is a condition of knowledge, is it not essential to apply the condition? Subsumption is inevitably constitution (in the non-ontological sense to which Kant limits himself.(
4.1.4	(اولین جمله‌یِ پاراگراف آخرِ مقاله) This is why we can say that in a certain sense everything is a posteriori: everything that a posteriori points out to me is irreplaceable and new, and the exploration of the world is infinite.	(صفحه‌یِ 101 کتاب) This is why we can say that in a certain sense everything is a posteriori: everything that perception points out to me is irreplaceable and new, and the exploration of the world is infinite.
	باقی مقاله هم، تا آن‌جا که حوصله‌یِ من پای‌مردی کرد، رونوشتی است از کتاب، البته با کمی، فقط کمی، تغییر.
5 [M]	محمود خاتمی The Psychological Element in the Phenomenological Analysis of Human Subjectivity «آن را مقاله* می‌خوانم»
5.1		محمود خاتمی ، تفسیری از امر پیشینی کانت، فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه، 1384/01/01، 1، 1. (مقاله) «این را مقاله می‌خوانم»
5.1.1	(صفحه‌یِ 126) In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the transcendental aspect of human subjectivity, Kant prefers a reflective analysis which makes the transcendental subject appear. …	این همان جمله‌یِ اولی است که از مقاله نقل کردم، تنها به جای «the a priori» آمده است «transcendental subject» و مشابه‌های‌اش.  In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the a priori, Kant prefers a reflective analysis which makes the a priori appear. …
	هفت صفحه‌ی مقاله‌* بخشی از مقاله است که با این تفاوت که  «a priori»ها با «transcendental»ها جای‌گزین شده اند.
6 [Y1]	(ThPhDT)
7 [Y]	محمود خاتمی، روانشناسی فلسفی: درآمدی به حیات نفس انسان، ترجمهٔ یاسر پوراسماعیل ۱۳۸۷، نشر علم. (۱) (گفت و گو با ياسرپور اسماعيل، اطلاعات حکمت و معرفت)
7.1	قطعات زیر را یاسر پوراسماعیل از فایلی که محمود خاتمی از طریق ایمیل برای او ارسال کرده نقل کرده است.	Mercier, Désiré, et al. 1916. A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd.
7.1.1	1. Object of Psychology.—Psychology (‘ilm al-nafs) is that department of philosophy which contemplates the human soul. The soul, understood in its most general sense, denotes that which makes a being live; it is the first principle of life in a living being. If regard be paid only to the etymology of the word, the object of psychology should be co-extensive with all living beings, vegetable and animal as well as man. Custom, however, has restricted it at the present day, so that psychology is limited to the study of man.	1. Object of Psychology.—Psychology (ψυχή, λογός) is that department of philosophy which contemplates the human soul. The soul, understood in its most general sense, denotes that which makes a being live; it is the first principle of life in a living being. If regard be paid only to the etymology of the word, the object of psychology should be co-extensive with all living beings, vegetable and animal as well as man. Custom, however, has restricted it at the present day, so that psychology is limited to the study of man.
7.1.2	4. According to popular ideas the ordinary sign of life is movement without any apparent external cause.    A bird on the wing, a creeping insect, a fish darting up stream, all awaken in us the idea of life.   The untrained mind of the savage and the child fondly imagines that even any piece of automatic mechanism is gifted with life; the child, for instance, wants to see the little animal that makes the ticking inside the watch. On the other hand, as soon as an object that was once seen to live has ceased to move, we consider its life to have departed and immediately declare it dead.	4. According to popular ideas the ordinary sign of life is movement without any apparent external cause. A bird on the wing, a creeping insect, a fish darting up stream, all awaken in us the idea of life. The untrained mind of the savage and the child fondly imagines that even any piece of automatic mechanism is gifted with life; the child, for instance, wants to see the little animal that makes the ticking inside the watch. On the other hand, as soon as an object that was once seen to live has ceased to move, we consider its life to have departed and immediately declare it dead.
7.1.3	93. Answers to Certain Objections.—First objection: The power of abstraction we have been claiming for the intellect is objected to by Berkeley as unreal. According to him, I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separately from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either a white, or a black, or a tawny, or a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man.	(P. 247) 93. Answers to Certain Objections.—First objection : The power of abstraction we have been claiming for the intellect is objected to by Berkeley as unreal. 'I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separately from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame to myself must be either a white, or a black, or a tawny, or a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man ' 32.
7.1.4	(آخرین جملات خاتمی) The object that is best suited to the imperfect conditions of our feeble intelligence is what is knowable through the medium of the senses, the in­telligible presented in the sensible. Hence the soul's natural activity can be most perfectly exercised only when the soul is united to the body; and therefore a resurrection or reunion with the body is natural to man.	(p. 327) The object that is best suited to the imperfect conditions of our feeble intelligence is what is knowable through the medium of the senses, the intelligible presented in the sensible. Hence the soul's natural activity can be most perfectly exercised only when the soul is united to the body ; and therefore a resurrection or reunion with the body is natural to man.
	فایلی که محمود خاتمی به عنوان نوشتۀ خودش به من داد تا من ترجمه کنم، کپی کلمه به کلمه‌ای است از فصل psychology همین کتاب (از ص 161 تا 329)
8 [Y3]	…