انتحالِ مضاعف

(با تذکرِ برخی دوستان مشفق دریافتم که لحن و عنوانِ پست‌ام مناسب نیستند. به همین سبب عنوان و برخی جمله‌هایِ متن را تغییر دادم)
احتمالن بسیاری از خوانندگان این‌جا و این‌جا را دیده اند و مطلع اند که محمودِ خاتمی متهم به سرقتِ علمی‌ شده است. تا دریابم که ابعادِ انتحال چقدر است، رجمن بالغیب، مقاله‌ای را از کارنامه‌یِ ایشان برگزیدم و به محکِ کاشف‌ الاسرارِ گوگل زدم. متاسفانه در این مقاله هم خاتمی مرتکبِ سرقت شده است. اما کاوشِ بیش‌تر نشان داد که در این‌ مورد نوعی خاصی از انتحال رخ داده است. یعنی اوضاع چنان است که «گویی» نویسنده از مقاله‌یِ منحولِ خود، انتحال کرده است.

اما تفصیلِ مطلب

در کارنامه‌یِ سوابق محمودِ خاتمی از جمله این مقاله آمده است:

محمود خاتمی ، تفسیری از امر پیشینی کانت، فصلنامه حکمت و فلسفه، 1384/01/01، 1، 1.

که منظور این مقاله است. (از این بعد این را مقاله می‌خوانم)

در صفحه‌یِ 83، دومینِ صفحه‌یِ مقاله، بخشی آغاز می‌شود که اولین پاراگرافِ آن از این قرار است:

In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the a priori, Kant prefers a reflective analysis which makes the a priori appear. The reflective analysis, basing itself on synthetic judgments, shows that "the highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."(194) These conditions make the a priori appear. The medium of synthetic judgments is the "whole in which all our representations are contained," that is, inner sense, whose a priori form is time. And the unity required in judgment rests on the unity of apperception. This unity, which tends to emphasize the "I" of the "I think," is, at least in the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason, the keystone of the Kantian system. But we find even in its first edition that all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to transcendental consciousness "namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception."(142) For "we are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge."(141) It is therefore an absolutely primary principle that the various empirical consciousnesses must be linked to one unique consciousness of self. This consciousness is the simple representation: “I.” Kant adds: ''Whether this repre­ sentation is clear (empirical consciousness) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily conditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty."(142)

اگر جمله‌هایِ اول را گوگل کنید در صفحه‌هایِ 12 و 13 کتاب

Dufrenne, Mikel. The notion of the A Priori. Northwestern University Press, 2009.

(در مقدمه اشاره شده است که کتاب اول‌بار در سالِ 1966 چاپ شده است) که این پس آن را کتاب می‌خوانم، این جمله‌ها را خواهید یافت:

In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the a priori manifested by synthetic judgments, Kant performs both a reflective analysis which makes the transcendental subject appear and an analysis-termed phenomenological by Ricoeur⁸⁸­-which tends to psychologize the transcendental. The reflective analysis, basing itself on synthetic judgments, shows that "the highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience."³⁴ These conditions make transcendental subjectivity appear. The medium of all synthetic judgments is the "whole in which all our representations are contained" –i.e., inner sense, whose a priori form is time. And the unity required in judgment "rests on the unity of apperception." This unity, which tends to emphasize the "I" of the "I think," is, at least in the second edition of the Critique, the keystone of the Kantian system. But we find it even in the first edition: all empirical consciousness has a necessary relation to transcendental consciousness-"namely, the consciousness of myself as original apperception."⁸⁵ For "we are conscious a priori of the complete identity of the self in respect of all representations which can ever belong to our knowledge." ³⁶ It is therefore an absolutely primary principle that the various empirical consciousnesses must be linked to one unique consciousness of self. This consciousness is the simple representation: I. Kant adds: ''Whether this representation is clear (empirical consciousness ) or obscure, or even whether it ever actually occurs, does not here concern us. But the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge is necessarily con­ ditioned by relation to this apperception as a faculty."³⁷

اگرچه کمابیش کاری عبث است، زیرِ عبارت‌هایِ مشابه خط کشیده ام.

پارگرافِ بعدیِ مقاله‌ چنین آغاز می‌شود:

Nevertheless, this “faculty” does further enlighten us concerning the nature of a priori characteristic of subjectivity. Above all, it permits us to discern in the "I think," "this spontaneity" by means of which I can "call myself an intelligence"(169), the act of understanding: ''The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding”.(143)

و پاراگرافِ بعدیِ کتاب چنین:

Yet this faculty does further enlighten us concerning the nature of subjectivity. Above all, it permits us to discern in the "I think" -"this spontaneity" by means of which I can "call myself an intelligence"³⁸-the act of understanding: ''The unity of ap­ perception in relation to the synthesis of imagination is the understanding. ''³⁹

پاراگراف بعدی مقاله، در صفحه‌یِ 81، چنین آغاز می‌شود:

However, if the a priori is a condition of knowledge, it is essential to apply the condition and in this context subsumption is inevitably constitution in the non-ontological sense to which Kant limits himself.

و در صفحه‌یِ 14 کتاب آمده است:

If the a priori is a condition of knowledge, is it not essential to apply the condition? Subsumption is inevitably constitution (in the non-ontological sense to which Kant limits himself .(

برایِ این که سرتان را درد نیاورم، این هم اولین جمله‌یِ پاراگراف آخرِ مقاله، قبل از نتیجه‌گیری، است:

This is why we can say that in a certain sense everything is a posteriori: everything that a posteriori points out to me is irreplaceable and new, and the exploration of the world is infinite.

و در صفحه‌یِ 101 کتاب آمده است:

This is why we can say that in a certain sense everything is a posteriori: everything that perception points out to me is irreplaceable and new, and the exploration of the world is infinite.

باقی مقاله هم، تا آن‌جا که حوصله‌یِ من پای‌مردی کرد، رونوشتی است از کتاب، البته با کمی، فقط کمی، تغییر.

کاش مصیبت همین‌جا تمام می‌شد. اما نمی‌شود.

محمود خاتمی مقاله‌ای دیگر هم دارد با این عنوان:

The Psychological Element in the Phenomenological Analysis of Human Subjectivity

(از این بعد آن را مقاله* می‌خوانم)

در صفحه‌یِ 126 مقاله* آمده است:

In order to establish simultaneously the nature and function of the transcendental aspect of human subjectivity, Kant prefers a reflective analysis which makes the transcendental subject appear ...

این همان جمله‌یِ اولی است که از مقاله نقل کردم، تنها به جای «the a priori» آمده است «transcendental subject» و مشابه‌های‌اش. 

پاراگرافِ بعدیِ مقاله* چنین آغاز می‌شود:

Nevertheless, this ''faculty'' does further enlighten us concerning the nature of subjectivity.

اگر با موردِ مشابهِ مقاله مقایسه کنید می‌بینید که تنها «a priori characteristic of» حذف شده است.

پاراگراف بعدی مقاله* چنین آغاز می‌شود:

However, if the transcendental is a condition of knowledge, it is essential to apply the condition and in this context, subsumption is inevitably constitution in the non-ontological sense to which Kant limits himself.

باز هم «a priori»ِ بدبخت جایِ خود را به «transcendental»ِ خوش‌بخت داده است. هفت صفحه‌یِ مقاله‌* بخشی از مقاله است که با این تفاوت که «a priori»ها با «transcendental»ها (که لابد تعویض‌پذیرِ حافظ‌الصدق اند و تفننن این دو اصطلاح برای مفهومی واحد وضع شده اند) جای‌گزین شده اند. دقت در متن و پاراگراف‌بندیِ مقاله* آشکار می‌کند که منبعِ آن مقاله بوده است و نه کتاب. یعنی ایشان بعد از چهار سال دست به «انتحال» از مقاله‌یِ منحول خود زده است.